



IoT LINUX / FORENSICS



CHAMPLAIN COLLEGE

Leahy Center for Digital Forensics & Cybersecurity

HELLO!



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IoT LINUX FORENSICS

is becoming Important to Digital Forensics Investigators; Are You Caught Up?



A PRIMER

- ✗ IoT security issues are often overlooked
- ✗ Devices can interconnect throughout a consumer network
- ✗ Devices could be assembled from different components manufactured by different producers.



PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- ✕ Research and utilize access methods in a forensic setting
- ✕ Many devices available at the Leahy Center
- ✕ Software and Hardware level research
- ✕ Root access to look into file system
- ✕ Open-Source Linux tools
- ✕ Logs, config files, user artifacts



IoT DEVICE FILE SYSTEMS

- ✗ The most common file systems found on IoT firmwares:
 - Ext2
 - Cramfs
 - JFFS2
 - Squashfs
 - YAFFS2

- ✗ They can be identified using their signature (still under research)



IoT DEVICE COMPRESSION METHODS

Compression is used on most devices due to limited space:

- ✗ Gzip
- ✗ LZMA
- ✗ Zlib
- ✗ Zip



ACCESS METHODS TO IoT DEVICES

- ✗ Software and Hardware exploits
 - Known exploits that can lead to root
- ✗ Different Interfaces to access the IoT device
 - Web
 - USB
 - Ethernet
- ✗ JTAG/UART



WHY UART COMMUNICATION?

- ✗ Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
- ✗ Allows interacting with devices:
 - Reading debug logs
 - Bootloader access
 - admin/admin, root/toor, admin/password
 - Get root...



HOW MANY UART PINS?

- ✗ Many devices use 8-pins for read/write
- ✗ 4-pins were used for the devices used in this research, since only reading was required
 - E.g. the camera only allows reading



SERIAL COMMUNICATION?

- ✗ Most IoT devices use Serial Communication and protocols
- ✗ Transfer 1-bit at a time
- ✗ Common Channels: RS232, USB, HDMI, etc




BAUD RATE

- ✗ The rate at which information is transferred
- ✗ UART has no clock rate
- ✗ Ex. 9600 baud, 19200 baud, 115200 baud



UART CONVERTER

- ✗ Translates serial data into readable data via USB
- ✗ Requires additional cabling (often included)
- ✗ Purchased on Amazon





DEVICES RESEARCHED

- Smart Home:
 - Philips Hue Lights
 - Pet Cube Play
 - Nest Thermostat
- Security Systems:
 - Samsung SmartCam
 - D-Link 5030L Wifi Cam
 - Ring Video Doorbell
- Voice Assistants:
 - Amazon Echo
 - Google Home
 - Facebook Portal
- Smart Hubs:
 - Samsung Smartthings Hub
 - Wink Hub 2
 - Circle by Disney

IoT Catalog (p1) ...

Device Name	Identifier No.	Identifier Type	Manufacturer	Status	Physical Factory Reset	Ethernet Port	USB Connector	JTAG Access	Remote Exploit
Echo	SK705DI	Model No.	Amazon	Untouched	YES	NO	NO		
Echo Dot 2nd gen	RS03QR	Model No.	Amazon	Untouched	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
Echo Look	PL67WR	Model No.	Amazon	Untouched					
Echo Spot	VN94DQ	Model No.	Amazon	Untouched	YES				
Echo Show (10" Screen)	DW84JL	Model No.	Amazon	Untouched	YES				
Echo Show	MW46WB	Model No.	Amazon	Untouched	YES				
Cloud Cam	PB04JL	Model No.	Amazon	Untouched	YES				
Google Home Hub	8929AA0GS20	Serial No.	Google	Being Researched/Worked On	YES				
Home	6C07AYWE00	Serial No.	Google	Untouched	YES				
Google WiFi Point	3701HT0062F	Serial No.	Google	Untouched	YES				
Nest Thermostat	69EM02M10E01	Serial No.	Google	Untouched	NO				
Nest Thermostat	09AB01AC461615CE	Serial No.	Google	Untouched	NO	NO	YES	YES	
Nest Cam Indoor	18B4305A27C0	Serial No.	Google	Untouched	NO				
Nest Guard	07AA01AD41170DBN	Serial No.	Google	Untouched	YES				
Nest Protect	06C	Model No.	Google	Untouched	YES				
Nest Protect	06A	Model No.	Google	Untouched	YES				
Nest Cam Indoor	18B4304E6DCE	Serial No.	Google	Untouched					
Ring Video Doorbell	BHL11637CH005687-1	Serial No.	Ring	Untouched	YES	NO	NO		
Ring Video Doorbell	BHR41652LH006322	Serial No.	Ring	Untouched	YES				
Ring Stick Up Cam	BHS2LH1646006907	Serial No.	Ring	Untouched		NO	YES	YES	
Kasa Cam	2186004R02109	Serial No.	TP-Link	Untouched	YES	NO	YES	YES	
Logi Circle	V-R0005	Model No.	Logitech	Untouched	YES	NO	YES		
Connect WiFi Camera	NS-CH1IPC8	Model No.	Insignia	Untouched					
SimpliCam	007542E	Model No.	SimpliSafe	Untouched	YES				
Canary Flex	C600K1703633	Serial No.	Canary	Untouched	YES				
Circle 2	V-R0008	Model No.	Logitech	Untouched	YES				
WeMo Insight Switch	221620K120014D	Serial No.	Belkin	Untouched	YES				
WeMo Light Switch	221624K130031A	Serial No.	Belkin	Untouched	YES				
Ecobee 3	EB-STATE3-02	Model No.	Ecobee	Untouched	NO				
Dojo Pebble + (Base)	DBB000042	Model No.	Bullguard	Untouched	YES				
SmartThings Hub	IM6001-V3P01	Model No.	Zigbee	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	YES	YES		
Blink XT Security Camera System	PRODUCT MISSING	PRODUCT MISSING	Blink	Untouched					
Nexus 7	D80KBC769433	Serial No.	Asus	Untouched	NO				
Nexus 7	D90KBC250069	Serial No.	Asus	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	NO	YES		
Nexus 7	D80KBC758481	Serial No.	Asus	Untouched	NO				
iPad 6	DMPRXHAGV5VJ	Serial No.	Apple	Untouched	NO				
iPad 6	GG7XKNGXJMV	Serial No.	Apple	Untouched	NO				
Tile Mates and Slim	M04P9000183013L	Serial No.	Anatel	Untouched	NO				
Schlage Sense	BE479CAM619	Model No.	Schlage	Untouched	YES				
Circle with Disney	8CE2DAF10D7F	Serial No.	Circle Media	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	YES	YES		YES
Circle with Disney	8CE2DAF053BA	Serial No.	Circle Media	Untouched	YES				

IoT Catalog (p2) ...

Portal	B81A01BUS	Model No.	Facebook	Untouched	YES				
Caseta Wireless Dimmer Kit with SmartThings Hub	01923D90	Serial No.	Lutron	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	YES	YES	YES	MAYBE
Eggminder	ZM5304AU	Model No.	SmartThings	Untouched	YES				
Samsung Galaxy Tab A	ABAA00027468	Serial No.	Juiky + General Electric	Untouched	NO				
Wink Hub 2	R52M80B71CK	Serial No.	Samsung	Untouched	NO				
Wink Hub	WZE11642001191	Serial No.	Wink	Untouched	YES				
Wink Hub	161801243WZD1	Serial No.	Wink	Untouched	YES				
Wink Hub	151100501WZD1	Serial No.	Wink	Untouched	YES				
Ring Base Station	BHBS11744PG001975	Serial No.	Ring	Untouched	YES				
Wifi Smart Thermostat	1649JA007682	Serial No.	Honeywell	Untouched	NO				
Beam Alert	ZMD12IGC6000232	Serial No.	Zmodo	Untouched	YES				
Greet Smart WiFi Doorbell	ZMD12EA48000087	Serial No.	Zmodo	Untouched	YES				
Cujo	PRODUCT MISSING	PRODUCT MISSING	Cujo	Untouched					
Hue Personal Lighting System	MP051503490184	Serial No.	Philips	Untouched	YES				
Hue Personal Lighting System (White Starter Kit)		Serial/Model No. Not Found	Philips	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	YES	NO	YES	
LG Lucky	508VTZC0431621	Serial No.	LG	Untouched	YES				
Samsung Smart Cam	KJD76V2F40002KW	Serial No.	Samsung	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Samsung Smart Cam	KHNL6V2H60048PE	Serial No.	Samsung	Being Researched/Worked On	YES				
ADT Security Hub	1739020005764334	Serial No.	Samsung	Untouched	YES				
D-Link HD Pan WIFI Camera (White)	RZZK1G9002702	Serial No.	D-Link	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	YES	YES		YES
SimpliSafe Security System	00005F83	Serial No.	SimpliSafe	Untouched					
Petcube Play	PP211NV5LRV	Model No.	Petcube	Untouched	YES				
Guardzilla All-In-One Security System	FCAX53UZ79E55NSW111A	Model No.	Guardzilla	Untouched	YES				
Canary 100USBK Indoor Camera	C100K1607590	Serial No.	Canary	Being Researched/Worked On	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
D-Link WiFi Camera (Black)	QEEF1G8001327	Serial No.	D-Link	Untouched	YES				
D-Link WiFi Camera (White)	QXLB1I400877	Serial No.	D-Link	Untouched	YES				
D-Link Wi-Fi Camera (Black)	RZZN1GC005522	Serial No.	D-Link	Untouched	YES				
Loxex LCD monitor and recorder	WA0216103707	Serial No.	Flir	Untouched	NO				
Loxex HD WiFi Security Camera	PRODUCT MISSING	PRODUCT MISSING	Flir	Untouched	YES				
Motorola baby monitor	VT16037003248	Serial No.	Motorola	Untouched	NO				
Arlo Pro Security System (Base)	4R026A7FA1C19	Serial No.	Netgear	Untouched	YES				
Kwikset Kevo Smart Lock		Serial/Model No. Not Found	Kwikset	Being Researched/Worked On	YES				
Kevo Deadbolt 2nd Gen		Serial/Model No. Not Found	Kwikset	Untouched	YES				
Norton Core	COR11C779920	Serial No.	Norton	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	YES	YES		NO
OnHub	TGR1900	Model No.	TP-Link / Google	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Google Home	6C07AYWE00	Serial No.	Google	Being Researched/Worked On	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO

Available Interfaces for Access

Device	Ethernet Port	USB Connector	Remote Exploit	Hardware Exploit	JTAG Access
Canary USB100UK	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Samsung SmartCam HD Pro (Chinese)	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Lutron Caseta	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
D-Link HD Pan WIFI Camera (White)	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Philips Hue White Starter Kit	YES	NO		YES	YES
Circle with Disney	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Wink Hub 2	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Philips Hue Bridge (Old)	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Samsung SmartThings Hub	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Arlo	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Google OnHub	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Philips Hue Bridge (New)	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Norton Core	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Samsung SmartCam HD Pro	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Portal	NO	YES			
Amazon Echo	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
Google Home	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Amazon Echo Dot	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lorex	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Petcube Play					

Surface Mapping (Ports & Services)

Device Name	MAC Address	Open Ports	Services	Operating System	Linux Access Method
Canary USB100UK	D8:42:E2:03:08:68	none	--	--	
Samsung SmartCam HD Pro (Chinese)	00:16:6C:85:04:76	80 / 443 / 554 / 943 / 4520 / 49152	HTTP / HTTP / RTSP / Silverlight / RTSP / UPNP	Linux 2.6.32	
Lutron Caseta	B0:D5:CC:00:C4:70	22 / 4548 / 8081 / 8083	ssh / synchromesh / blackice-icecap / us-srv	Linux 3.11-4.1	
D-Link HD Pan WIFI Camera (White)	B0:c5:54:35:e0:a0	80 / 443	HTTP / HTTPS/ssl	--	
Philips Hue White Starter Kit (Philips Hue Bridge)	00:17:88:48:BB:B1	80 / 443 / 8080 / 22	HTTP / HTTPS/ssl / HTTP-Proxy	Linux (Specialized) (OpenWRT)	PuTTY
Circle with Disney	8C:E2:DA:F0:53:B9	80 / 443 / 4444 / 4567	rtsp / rtsp / rtsp / rtsp	Linux 3.0 (Specialized)	
Wink Hub 2	00:21:CC:4B:E1:7F	1883 / 8886	mqtt / unknown	Linux 3.2 - 4.9	
Philips Hue Bridge (Old)	00:17:88:1C:0F:78	80	HTTP	lwIP Stack	
Smartthings Hub	28:6D:97:7C:F5:EC	443 / 8889 / 8890 / 39500	http / ddi-tcp-2 / ddi-tcp-2 / hubCore	Linux 3.2 - 4.9	
Arlo Pro	10:DA:43:CD:12:D1	5061	sip-tls	Linux 2.6.19-2.6.36	
Google OnHub	A4:2B:B0:CE:B5:13	none	-	-	Hardware Root
Google Home Hub	1C:F2:9A:4A:FB:F3	7778 / 8008 / 8009 / 8443 / 9000 / 10001	interwise / http / castv2 / https-alt / cslistener / scp-config	Fortinet FortiGate 100D Firewall	
Nest Thermostat					
Canary Flex (UNUSABLE)	--	--	--	--	--
Facebook Portal	A4:0E:2B:00:A5:19	none	--	--	
Amazon Echo	AC:63:BE:6B:37:50	4070 / 4071 / 55442 / 55443	http/http/nagios-ncsa/ssl	FireOS	
Google Home	F4:F5:D8:C8:BB:04	8008 / 8009 / 8443 / 9000 / 10001	http / ajp13 / https-alt / cslistener / scp-config	Linux 2.6.32-3.10	
Logitech Circle	44:73:D6:05:91:C4	--	--	Unknown	
Guardzilla All-In-One HD	E0:B9:4D:21:0D:DB	23	telnet	Linux 2.6.32-3.10	Telnet
Nest Thermostat	18:B4:30:B7:45:29	--	--	--	--
Canary Pro	D8:42:E2:02:E1:58	none	--	"Too many fingerprints match this host to give specific OS details"	
Amazon Cloud Cam	FC:A1:83:24:7B:14	--		FireOS	

DEVICES INVESTIGATED

...



✗ Philips Hue Bridge

✗ D-Link HD Pan Wifi Cam 5030I



FORENSIC WORKFLOW

STEP ONE: DATAGEN AND ACQUISITION

1. Factory Reset
2. Utilize Device as normal
3. Document actions in Timeline
4. Connect device to UART converter
5. Use Linux machine to access shell (Kali/Ubuntu)



STEP TWO: FINDING THE BAUD RATE OF A DEVICE

- ✗ Installing Python
- ✗ Installing Pyserial
- ✗ Baudrate.py by DevTTY50



3. SETTING UP SERIAL PORTS IN LINUX





- ✗ Connect the UART hardware to the computer
- ✗ Confirm whether or not the device is connected
- ✗ Setserial
- ✗ `chmod 666 /dev/ttyUSB0`
- ✗ `cu -l /dev/ttyUSB0 -s 115200`

D-LINK DCS-5030L SECURITY

CAMERA

Accessing Backend Linux
Systems via UART

x F232 UART Device Connection



SERIAL COMMUNICATION USING PUTTY

- ✗ COM8, F232 UART device location
- ✗ 57600, Baud rate of D-Link Smart Cameras

```
COM8 - PuTTY

U-Boot 1.1.3

Board: Ralink APSoC DRAM: 128 MB
relocate_code Pointer at: 87fb4000
flash manufacture id: c2, device id 20 17
find flash: MX25L6405D

-----
Ralink UBoot Version: 4.3.0.0
-----


ASIC 7628_MP (Port5<->None)
DRAM component: 1024 Mbits DDR, width 16
DRAM bus: 16 bit
Total memory: 128 MBytes
Flash component: SPI Flash

-----
icache: sets:512, ways:4, linesz:32 ,total:65536
dcache: sets:256, ways:4, linesz:32 ,total:32768

##### The CPU freq = 575 MHZ #####
estimate memory size =128 Mbytes
RESET MT7628 PHY!!!!!!
Signature: DCS-5030L      Al      Release 1.01 (2015-03-09)

RT2880_AGPIOCFG_REG = fe00ff
RT2880_GPIOMODE_REG = 55054025
RT2880_GPIOMODE_REG+0x04 = 555
RT2880_REG_PIODIR = 3fc000
RT2880_REG_6332PIODIR = 1640
RT2880_REG_6332PIODATA = 2c4f

Please choose the operation:
1: Load system code to SDRAM via TFTP.
2: Load system code then write to Flash via TFTP.
3: Boot system code via Flash (default).
```



dlinkSerial.log

BOOTLOADER

Booting System via Flash, opening MIPS Linux Kernel Image

```
COM8 - PuTTY
RESET MT7628 PHY!!!!!!
Signature: DCS-5030L      A1      Release 1.01 (2015-03-09)

RT2880_AGPIOCFG_REG = fe00ff
RT2880_GPIOMODE_REG = 55054025
RT2880_GPIOMODE_REG+0x04 = 555
RT2880_REG_PIODIR = 3fc000
RT2880_REG_6332PIODIR = 1640
RT2880_REG_6332PIODATA = 2c4f

Please choose the operation:
  1: Load system code to SDRAM via TFTP.
  2: Load system code then write to Flash via TFTP.
  3: Boot system code via Flash (default).
  4: Entr boot command line interface.
  7: Load Boot Loader code then write to Flash via Serial.
  9: Load Boot Loader code then write to Flash via TFTP.
You choosed 3

3: System Boot system code via Flash.
## Booting image at bc050000 ...
  Image Name:   Linux Kernel Image
  Image Type:   MIPS Linux Kernel Image (lzma compressed)
  Data Size:    7653355 Bytes =  7.3 MB
  Load Address: 80000000
  Entry Point:  8000c150
  Verifying Checksum ... OK
  Uncompressing Kernel Image ... OK
No initrd
## Transferring control to Linux (at address 8000c150) ...
## Giving linux memsize in MB, 128

Starting kernel ...
```

Device Bootloader

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METADATA REVEALED ON FIRST LOGIN

- ✗ Saved JPEG images, Saved MP4 video settings
- ✗ Files appear to be cached locally until Reset Button is pushed
- ✗ Admins password changed automatically after login, cannot elevate to sudo once logged in, but resets to [u:admin p:] after every boot, leaving root shell vulnerable

COM8 - PuTTY

```
@@@@ Check uid = Sh3CsY2Mjbe4aie9
wlan key: 2899f62f
*** Total Policy Entry = 20
*** Total Notifier Entry = 20
*** Total Reactor Entry = 80
```

```
Sun Jan  1 00:00:00 UTC 2017
Resolution = 3
Compression = 2
FrameRate = 15
MJPEG frame count = 8
MJPEG frame size = 524243
H264Resolution = 3
H264BitRate = 6
H264FrameRate = 30
H264 I-frame count = 9
H264 P-frame count = 60
H264 frame size = 430035
max_h264x_queue = 45
DayModeLevel = 140
NightModeLevel = 100
```

```
*****
*   INTERNET.SH   *
*****
```

```
chpasswd: warning: cannot lock '/etc/passwd': Permission denied
Password for 'admin' changed
```

```
telnetd/ftpd close !!!
```


```
pcmcmd: Freq=11025, Frames per Page=1024
save to header file : /var/run/audio.header
[Mic Volume]: 50 (i2c=12b)
[HeadPhoneL Volume]: 80 (i2c=e9)
[HeadPhoneR Volume]: 80 (i2c=1e9)
```

AUTORUNNING FS SCRIPTS WITHOUT SHELL INPUT

```
SS_FOUND, channel = 9
@@@@ ApcliMlmeProbeReqAction
Ad->CommonCfg.Channel = 1
ApcliMlmeProbeReqAction, Found IOTLinux in scanTable , goto channel 9
SS_FOUND, channel = 9
@@@@ ApcliMlmeProbeReqAction
Ad->CommonCfg.Channel = 1
ApcliMlmeProbeReqAction, Found IOTLinux in scanTable , goto channel 9
SS_FOUND, channel = 9
```


- ✗ BSS_FOUND/BSS_NOT_FOUND showing the radio antenna actively searching for previously established connections, even when antenna is unplugged from board
- ✗ Found IOTLinux, showing that previously connected WiFi network data/IP tables are stored internally. Active connections were disabled during this serial session, meaning D-Link could not have scanned for available SSIDs

PHILIPS HUE BRIDGE



PHILIPS HUE BRIDGE – ACCESSING THROUGH HARDWARE HACKING

- ✗ F232 UART device location
- ✗ 115200 baud rate
- ✗ Shorting contact to bypass bootloader
- ✗ Accessing root shell
- ✗ Using dropbear to remotely connect to root shell



SPLASH SCREEN W/ SSH

- ✗ Uses outdated algorithm, makes accessing system much easier
- ✗ Connected at 10.0.0.2/24
- ✗ Access shell using default user and password

```
kali@kali:~$ sudo ssh -oKexAlgorithms=+diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 root@10.0.0.2
The authenticity of host '10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:t32HaEKdajOgzu6fOEw48EVQkZWF4K+/XkVTxZMeCrE.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.0.0.2' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
root@10.0.0.2's password:
```

```
BusyBox v1.25.1 (2020-08-19 08:14:38 UTC) built-in shell (ash)
```

HUE Bridge ZYX

```
Version: 1941056000 Hardware Hacked by IoTLinuxForensics
```

```
root@Philips-hue ~#
```

Device Bootloader

GETTING OS INFORMATION

- ✗ `cat /etc/*release; uname -a`
- ✗ Will list the distro information and version of Linux

```
root@Philips-hue:/# cat /etc/*release
DISTRIB_ID='OpenWrt'
DISTRIB_RELEASE='Chaos Calmer'
DISTRIB_REVISION='r46875'
DISTRIB_CODENAME='chaos_calmer'
DISTRIB_TARGET='ar71xx/generic'
DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION='OpenWrt Chaos Calmer 15.05.1'
DISTRIB_TAINTS='no-all busybox override'
root@Philips-hue:/# uname -a
Linux Philips-hue 4.4.60 #1 Wed Aug 19 08:23:25 UTC 2020 mips GNU/Linux
root@Philips-hue:/#
```

NETWORK INFORMATION

- ✗ Ifconfig -a
- ✗ Lists network location for Remote access (Important for quarantine)

Device Boot

```
root@Philips-hue:/# ifconfig -a
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:03:7F:11:20:CE
          BROADCAST MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 B)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 B)
          Interrupt:4

eth1      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:17:88:48:BB:B1
          inet addr:10.0.0.2  Bcast:10.0.0.255  Mask:255.255.255.0
          inet6 addr: fe80::217:88ff:fe48:bbb1/64  Scope:Link
          inet6 addr: fd6a:6429:8e27::1/60  Scope:Global
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
          RX packets:729238 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:1109305 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:73315728 (69.9 MiB)  TX bytes:295099822 (281.4 MiB)
          Interrupt:5

lo        Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0
          inet6 addr: ::1/128  Scope:Host
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:65536  Metric:1
          RX packets:1480233 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:1480233 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1
          RX bytes:64846118 (61.8 MiB)  TX bytes:64846118 (61.8 MiB)

root@Philips-hue:/#
```

CHECKING FOR MOUNT POINTS

- ✗ mount
- ✗ Lists the location of file to image

```
root@Philips-hue:/# mount
/dev/root on /rom type squashfs (ro,relatime)
proc on /proc type proc (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,noatime)
sysfs on /sys type sysfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,noatime)
tmpfs on /tmp type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noatime)
/dev/ubi1_1 on /overlay type ubifs (rw,noatime)
overlayfs:/overlay on / type overlay (rw,noatime,lowerdir=/,upperdir=/overlay/upper,workdir=/overlay/work)
tmpfs on /dev type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,relatime,size=512k,mode=755)
devpts on /dev/pts type devpts (rw,nosuid,noexec,relatime,mode=600)
debugfs on /sys/kernel/debug type debugfs (rw,noatime)
root@Philips-hue:/# █
```


LISTING ROOT DIRECTORY

- ✗ Ls -al /
- ✗ Listing all directories in root Directory
- ✗ Timestamps and access permissions

```
root@Philips-hue:/# ls -al
drwxrwxrwx  1 root  root    480 Nov 11 20:34 .
drwxrwxrwx  1 root  root    480 Nov 11 20:34 ..
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root    777 Aug 28 11:38 bin
drwxr-xr-x  4 root  root   1280 Oct 14 21:09 dev
drwxr-xr-x  1 root  root    560 Aug 28 11:38 etc
drwxr-xr-x  1 root  root    432 Feb 27 2020 home
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root  root    78 Aug 19 07:43 init
drwxr-xr-x 11 root  root    854 Aug 28 11:38 lib
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root     3 Aug 19 08:12 mnt
drwxr-xr-x  4 root  root   360 Feb 27 2020 overlay
dr-xr-xr-x 64 root  root     0 Jan  1 1970 proc
drwxr-xr-x 17 root  root   247 Aug 28 11:38 rom
drwxr-xr-x  1 root  root   224 Nov  8 18:41 root
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root   702 Aug 28 11:38 sbin
dr-xr-xr-x 11 root  root     0 Jan  1 1970 sys
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root     0 Oct 14 21:33 temp
drwxrwxrwt 20 root  root   660 Nov 11 10:53 tmp
-rwxr-xr-t  1 root  root    20 Oct 21 19:47 tmp.gz
drwxr-xr-x  7 root  root    89 Aug 28 11:37 usr
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root  root     4 Aug 28 11:38 var → /tmp
drwxr-xr-x  4 root  root   230 Aug 28 11:38 www
root@Philips-hue:/#
```

LISTING ACTIVE SERVICES

- ✗ Netstat -tulpn
- ✗ Showing open ports and services being used by the device while running

```
root@Philips-hue:/# netstat -tulpn
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.1:9001          0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1241/ipbridge
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.1:9002          0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1285/behaviord
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.1:9003          0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1296/clipd
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:3245            0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1264/nginx.conf -g
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.1:3246          0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1296/clipd
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:80              0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1264/nginx.conf -g
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:8083            0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1264/nginx.conf -g
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:22              0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      989/dropbear
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:1338            0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1241/ipbridge
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:1339            0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1241/ipbridge
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:443             0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1264/nginx.conf -g
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:1883            0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1033/mosquitto
tcp      0      0 :::50051                 :::*                    LISTEN      1241/ipbridge
tcp      0      0 :::8080                  :::*                    LISTEN      1344/hk_hap
tcp      0      0 :::80                    :::*                    LISTEN      1264/nginx.conf -g
tcp      0      0 :::8083                   :::*                    LISTEN      1264/nginx.conf -g
tcp      0      0 :::22                     :::*                    LISTEN      989/dropbear
tcp      0      0 :::443                    :::*                    LISTEN      1264/nginx.conf -g
tcp      0      0 :::1883                   :::*                    LISTEN      1033/mosquitto
udp      0      0 0.0.0.0:46611           0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1069/mdnsd
udp      0      0 0.0.0.0:1900            0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1241/ipbridge
udp      0      0 0.0.0.0:5353            0.0.0.0:*                LISTEN      1069/mdnsd
udp      0      0 :::5353                   :::*                    LISTEN      1069/mdnsd
udp      0      0 :::48108                  :::*                    LISTEN      1069/mdnsd
root@Philips-hue:/# @ss
```


BUSYBOX

```
root@Philips-hue:/# ls -al bin
```

[illegible]

```

777 Aug 28 11:38 .
480 Nov 11 20:34 ..
  7 Aug 28 11:38 ash → busybox
265 Aug 19 07:43 board_detect
312640 Aug 19 08:14 busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 cat → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 chgrp → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 chmod → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 chown → busybox
3311 Aug 19 07:43 config_generate
  7 Aug 28 11:38 cp → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 date → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 dd → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 df → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 dmesg → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 echo → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 egrep → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 false → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 fgrep → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 fsync → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 grep → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 gunzip → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 gzip → busybox
1550 Aug 19 07:43 ipcalc.sh
  7 Aug 28 11:38 kill → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 ln → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 lock → busybox
  7 Aug 28 11:38 login → busybox
424 Aug 19 07:43 login.sh
  7 Aug 28 11:38 ls → busybox

```

/ETC

```
root@Philips-hue:/# ls -al /etc
```

```
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 560 Aug 28 11:38 .
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 480 Nov 11 20:34 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 Aug 28 11:38 TZ → /tmp/TZ
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 43 Aug 28 11:38 avahi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 768 Nov 4 20:14 banner
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 408 Aug 19 07:43 banner.failsafe
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 47 Aug 28 11:38 ca-certificates
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 853 Aug 28 11:38 clipd
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 768 Nov 4 20:37 config
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 3 Aug 19 08:12 crontabs
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 76 Aug 19 08:12 device_info
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6449 Aug 19 07:43 diag.sh
drwx----- 1 root root 392 Feb 27 2020 dropbear
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 352 Aug 19 08:11 firewall.user
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 10 Aug 28 11:38 fstab → /tmp/fstab
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 70 Aug 28 11:36 fw_env.config
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 140 Aug 28 11:38 group
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20 Aug 19 07:43 hosts
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 326 Aug 19 08:11 hotplug-preinit.json
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 66 Aug 28 11:38 hotplug.d
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1657 Aug 19 08:11 hotplug.json
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 61 Aug 28 11:38 hue-diagcd
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 436 Aug 28 11:38 init.d
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 107 Aug 28 11:36 inittab
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 34 Aug 28 11:38 iot-field-test
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 70 Aug 28 11:38 modules-boot.d
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 328 Aug 28 11:38 modules.d
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 37 Aug 28 11:38 mosquitto
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 12 Aug 28 11:38 mtab → /proc/mounts
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 290 Aug 28 11:38 nginx
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 34 Aug 28 11:38 ntpd
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 234 Aug 19 08:12 openwrt_release
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 8 Aug 19 08:12 openwrt_version
```

CUSTOM FIREWALL RULES



Root user has read and write permissions to change any settings in the firewall config files

```
root@Philips-hue:/# cat /etc/config/firewall

config defaults
    option input 'REJECT'
    option output 'ACCEPT'
    option forward 'REJECT'
    option synflood_protect '1'

config zone 'lan'
    option name 'lan'
    list network 'lan'
    option input 'REJECT'
    option output 'ACCEPT'
    option forward 'REJECT'
    option masq '1'
    option mtu_fix '1'

config rule 'clip'
    option name 'Allow-CLIP'
    option src 'lan'
    option proto 'tcp'
    option dest_port '80'
    option target 'ACCEPT'
    option family 'ipv4'

config rule 'factory'
    option name 'Allow-Factory'
    option src 'lan'
    option proto 'tcp'
    option dest_port '30000'
    option target 'ACCEPT'
    option family 'ipv4'
```



```

root@Philips-hue:~# cat /etc/firewall.user
# This file is interpreted as shell script.
# Put your custom iptables rules here, they will
# be executed with each firewall (re-)start.

# Internal uci firewall chains are flushed and recreated on reload, so
# put custom rules into the root chains e.g. INPUT or FORWARD or into the
# special user chains, e.g. input user rule or postrouting lan rule
root@Philips-hue:~# root@Philips-hue:~# cat /etc/group
root:x:0:
daemon:x:1:
adm:x:4:
nail:x:8:
audio:x:29:
www-data:x:33:
ftp:x:55:
users:x:100:
network:x:101:
nogroup:x:65534:
mosquitto:x:200:
root@Philips-hue:~#

```

File Actions Edit View Help


```

root@Philips-hue:/etc# cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/ash
daemon:*:1:1:daemon:/var:/bin/false
ftp:*:55:55:ftp:/home/ftp:/bin/false
network:*:101:101:network:/var:/bin/false
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/var:/bin/false
mosquitto:x:200:200:mosquitto:/var/run/mosquitto:/bin/false
root@Philips-hue:/etc# sw

```

Imaging on the Linux side

```
root@Philips-hue:/# ls
bin      etc      init     mnt      proc     root     sys      test.tar.gz  tmp.gz    var
dev      home    lib      overlay  rom      sbin     temp     tmp          usr       www
root@Philips-hue:/# nc 10.0.0.3 2222 < test.tar.gz
```



The result of the compressed tar will be something similar to what is listed below:

Name	Size	Packed Size	Modified	Mode	User	Group	Symbolic Link	Hard Link	Folders	Files
bin	326 467	328 192	2020-08-28 07:38	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			0	58
dev	20	0	2020-10-14 17:09	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			4	62
etc	556 644	606 720	2020-08-28 07:38	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			35	199
home	351 773	378 880	2020-02-27 12:55	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			20	135
lib	1 707 010	1 741 312	2020-08-28 07:38	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			12	135
mnt	0	0	2020-08-19 04:12	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			0	0
overlay	292 237	317 440	2020-02-27 12:57	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			21	168
proc	53 329	0		dr-xr-xr-x	root	root			1 525	18 692
rom	29 892 044	30 207 488	2020-08-28 07:38	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			94	1 264
root	0	0	2020-08-19 04:12	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			0	0
sbin	320 105	326 656	2020-08-28 07:38	drwxr-xr-x	root	root			0	44
sys	4 128	4 096	1969-12-31 20:00	dr-xr-xr-x	root	root			6	2
init	78	512	2020-08-19 03:43	-rwxr-xr-x	root	root				



CHALLENGE(S)

- ✗ COVID-19 Lockdown
 - Leahy Center Locked down from March – late September
- ✗ Smaller Team
 - Ali, Joseph, Austin, Sid
 - Zero previous IoT Experience!
- ✗ Lack of resources
 - Cloud vs. On-Board



WHAT COMES NEXT?

- ✗ IoT File Systems
- ✗ Detailed forensic acquisitions
- ✗ Automated forensics
- ✗ IoT Forensics Toolkit



THANKS!

Questions/Suggestions?

#hadi-linuxforensics-iot on the OSDFCon Discord Server

Ali Hadi, @binaryzOne via Twitter

Austin Grupposo, via LinkedIn

Joseph McCormack, via LinkedIn